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Recent Decisions
INTESTACY-INHERITANCE

LAWS-NON-MARITAL

DREN-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION-The

CHIL-

United

States Supreme Court, after examining a section of the Texas Probate Code which allowed a non-marital child to inherit from his or
her mother but denied similar inheritance from the natural father,
found it to be discriminatory against the non-marital child.

Reed v. Campbell, No. 85-755, slip op. (U.S. June 11, 1986).
In February, 1978, Delynda Ricker Barker Reed notified both
the Texas Probate Court and the Princess Campbell, administratrix, of her claim of inheritance to the intestate estate of Prince
Rupert Ricker.' A jury trial was held which affirmed that Prince
Ricker was Delynda's father. 2 However, Delynda's share of her father's estate was denied her under section 42 of the Texas Probate
Code I since an illegitimate (non-marital) child was not permitted
a share of her father's intestate estate.4
1. Reed v. Campbell, No. 85-755, slip op. at 2 (U.S. June 11, 1986), rev'g 682 S.W.2d
697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). When Delynda filed for determination of her heirship rights, the
other heirs filed for summary judgment since the 1956 statute controlled. This was denied
and the case went to trial.
2. Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). At the jury trial, six special
issues were presented. The jury found Delynda the child of Prince Ricker. It also found that
Annabel Boutwell, Delynda's mother, and Prince Ricker agreed to be married and participated in a ceremonial marriage. The jury failed to find that these two lived together as
husband and wife or held themselves to the public as married. In fact, the jury stated that
at the time of the ceremonial marriage, Delynda's mother believed he was already married.
This is significant because it eliminated recourse to TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 42 (Vernon
1980), which states: "The issue also of marriage deemed null in law shall nevertheless be
legitimate." 682 S.W.2d at 701.
3. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. art. 42 (Vernon 1980). As originally enacted in 1956, the
statute stated in pertinent part:
For the purpose of inheritance to, through, and from an illegitimate child, such child
shall be treated the same as if he were the legitimate child of his mother ... where a
man, having by a woman a child or children shall afterward intermarry with such
woman, such child or children shall thereby be legitimated and capable of inheriting
his estate.
Id.
4. Reed, No. 85-755, slip op. at 2. When the jury acknowledged Prince Ricker as
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In the interim between Prince Ricker's death and Delynda's filing of her claim, the United States Supreme Court had handed
down the decision of Trimble v. Gordon,5 wherein the Court held
that a state's interest in avoiding the innate problems of proving
paternity were insufficient for totally denying an illegitimate child
inheritance rights to his intestate father's estate.' According to
Trimble, blanket discrimination against non-marital children in intestate succession without a sufficient countervailing state purpose
is unconstitutional. However, when Delynda appealed the trial
court's decision to the Court of Appeals of Texas on several
grounds, including the unconstitutionality of section 42 of the
Texas Probate Code as construed in light of the Trimble decision,
the appellate court denied her charges.' Although section 42 was
invalidated, the appellate court refused to apply Trimble retroactively.' Delynda then appealed to the Texas Supreme Court on a
writ of error; however, the court ruled that there had been no reversible error.' 0 The case was then granted probable jurisdiction by
the United State Supreme Court." In a unanimous decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court reversed and remanded for fur2
ther proceedings.'
The Supreme Court's decision hinged upon the Texas court's apDelynda's father, a motion for summary judgment was made on the finding of paternity,
based upon the statutory discrimination under the federal Constitution. The opposing argument was twofold: (1) Trimble would not be applied retroactively when the death had occurred prior to Trimble and the filing of the claim occurred afterwards and (2) the limitations of the 1956 code applied. The trial court overruled Delynda's motion and entered
judgment for the defendants. Reed, 682 S.W.2d at 700.
5. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (decided on April 26, 1977).
6. Id. at 772.
7. Id. at 776.
8. Reed, No. 85-755, slip op. at 2. In Delynda's appeal to the State Court of Appeals,
the briefs and motions reiterated her earlier arguments and asked for relief due to the sexually discriminatory aspect of classifications based upon the sex of her deceased parent. The
appeals court affirmed the denial of her claim, stating that Trimble did not apply retroactively in this situation. The insurmountable barrier raised for Delynda's legitimation was
deemed supported by a rational state interest. The argument concerning sexual discrimination was not addressed. Brief for Appellant at 18, Reed v. Campbell, No. 85-755, slip op.
(U.S. June 11, 1986).
9. Reed, No. 85-755, slip op. at 2. The appellate court relied upon precedential law
which construed the language of § 37 of the probate code: "Whenever a person dies intestate, all of his estate shall vest immediately in his heirs at law" to mean application of the
code section in effect at the time of the parent's death. Brief for Appellant at 44, Reed v.
Campbell, No. 85-755, slip op. (U.S. June 11, 1986).
10. Id. The Texas Supreme Court, without written opinion, noted no reversible error
and denied rehearing on June 5, 1985.
11. Id., prob. juris. noted, 474 U.S. -,
88 L.Ed.2d 550 (1985).
12. Reed, No. 85-755, slip op. at 5.
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plication of Trimble. 3 The Court noted that at the time of the
trial court's decision in this case, Trimble had already invalidated
section 42 of the Texas Probate Code." This section, which allowed the non-marital child to inherit from her mother but denied
similar inheritance from the natural father, was examined and
found discriminatory against the non-marital child."' The Court
stated that in consideration of finality and the heirs' reliance upon
distribution, the state's interest in protecting closed estates was
valid.1 6 However, the Texas court erred in applying the unconstitutional probate section in Delynda's case.1"
According to the Supreme Court, neither the date of Prince
Ricker's death nor the date of Delynda's filing-either taken separately or conjunctively-should have been the basis of denying her
claim. 8 Although Delynda's claim utilized these dates in framing
the retroactive application of Trimble, the Supreme Court chose to
decide the case upon the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of
equal protection for non-marital children.1 ' The test was not retroactivity but instead whether or not the probate estate was still
open at the time of Delynda's filing.20 Since the estate was still
open, the law as announced in Trimble should apply.2 1 Although
the state may have a significant, countervailing interest in protecting an heir's reliance upon final probate rulings, this interest in
finality is not a concern in estates which are still open.2 2 Therefore,
equal protection for non-marital children necessitates allowing
them access to their natural father's intestate estate if the probate
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id.
16. Id. The Court stated in pertinent part:
The state interest in the orderly disposition of decedent's estates may justify the imposition of special requirements upon an illegitimate child who asserts a right to inherit from her father, and, of course, it justifies the enforcement of generally applicable limitations on the time and the manner in which claims may be asserted. After an
estate has been finally distributed, the interest in finality may provide an additional,
valid justification for barring the belated assertion of claims, even though they may
be meritorious and even though mistakes of law or fact may have occurred during the
probate process.
Id. at 4.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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estate is still open at the time of filing.13 To rule otherwise would
be "unjustified discrimination against children born out of
2
wedlock." 4
The tension and conflict found in section 42 of the Texas Probate Code is reflective of the struggles in other states to reconcile
today's social views with statutes grounded in attitudes begun centuries ago in England. The concept of bastardy as a harsh and oppressive punishment for the parents of illegitimate children began
in feudal common law.2 5 The child, called filius nullius,2" was considered the child of no one; therefore, such child was denied inheritance from both natural parents.2 7 Such moral opprobrium had economic consequences,28 such as primogeniture, which enabled the
eldest son to inherit the land. Since most illegitmate children were
offspring of noblemen and serf women, policy kept the land con29
centrated in the hands of the royalty.
The doctrine of filius nullius is replete with governmental cruelty.30 As the Industrial Revolution spread and the agrarian lifes23. Id.
24. Id. at 5.
25. Brief for Appellant at 5, Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
26. J. DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 113 (3d ed. 1984).
Although innocent of any sin or crime, children of unmarried parents were given
harsh, pitiless treatment by the common law. A child born out of wedlock was filius
nullius, the child of no one and could inherit from neither father nor mother . . .
Even though the father married the mother after the child's birth, he or she remained
the child of no one, without blood relations.
Id.
27. Brief for Appellant at 5, Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
English bastardy rules were directed primarily at the result of disinheritance. Filius nuUius
originally referred exclusively to inheritance matters, and only later was interpreted to deny
all relationship between bastard and parent. Id., citing H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND
SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
28. Brief for Appellant at 5, Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
29. Brief for Appellant at 6, Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
Under the feudal land system of primogeniture, legitimate sons were similarly disinherited
in favor of the eldest son; therefore, bastardy rules reinforced primogeniture. For example,
when a nobleman died, his estate passed to his eldest legitimate son. Other offspring, legitimate and illegitimate, were disinherited. Thus primogeniture preserved concentrated land
ownership. Instead of creating smaller and smaller estates among the heirs, the estate in its
entirety remained intact from generation to generation. Thus not only did property remain
within the landed class but the established social order was preserved. Obviously, not only
the remainder of the legitimate children but also the non-marital child suffered the brunt of
the combined effect of these two rules. Id.
30. L. TEICHMAN, ILLEGITIMACY: AN EXAMINATION OF BASTARDY 58-59 (1982). Teichman
notes that the practical effect of the bastardy rules in the feudal period was limited by
circumstances to the disinheritance of the child of a noble man and serf mother. History, he
states, records that bastardy often spread royal blood throughout the community. Although
kings frequently treated their non-marital sons well, serfs generally had no estate to leave
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tyle diminished, bastardy laws were enforced against the working
class. 3 1 Such application caused appalling human misery and
death. The almshouse was often the only solution for a pregnant,
unmarried woman. 2 The conditions were so unconscionable that
by 1760 eighty percent of the illegitimate children who were born
or left in the almshouse died within a year. 33 On the other hand,
survival meant that the child began laboring at the age of four . 3
American courts rejected English bastardy rules as applied to
the mother/child relationship from the earliest times.3 5 The liberalization began by rejecting statutes which disallowed the non-marital child maternal inheritance.3 6 However, the lack of recognition
of a legal status derived from the father continued. Paternity was
difficult to prove, and this became further justification for the
states' continued trend of paternal disinheritance: prevention of
spurious claims of paternity.3 7 Until recently, maternity has been
and no legally binding marriage sufficient to invoke meaningful application of the bastardy
rules. Id. at 56, 58.
31. Brief for Appellant at 6, Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
The bastardy rules which had their basic application for the landed class were now taken at
face value. Realistically, this meant that the impact of the rules' application was administered to the working class, as well as the wealthy. Id.
32. Id.
33. TEICHMAN, supra note 30, at 59. Teichman notes the following:
After the Industrial Revolution the Guardians of the Poor took to selling batches of
children to the owners. . . who would literally work them to death. Destitute infants
were never in short supply . . . [LIarge numbers of children four years old and over
who were used to work the new mills were mostly collected from parish workhouses,
• . . were taken. . . in carts like so many negro slaves in batches of from five to fifty
on the same day.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Brief, supra note 31, at 7. In Eaton v. Eaton, 88 Conn. 269, 91 A. 191 (1914), the
Supreme Court of Errors reviewed previous Connecticut cases and cited approvingly the
language of Brown v. Dye, 2 Root at 280-81 (Conn. 1795):
The common law of England . . . is not to be mentioned as an authority in opposition of the positive laws of our own state; and nothing can be more unjust than that
the innocent offspring should be punished for the crimes of their parents, by being
deprived of their right of inheritance by the mother.
88 Conn. at 279, 91 A. at 194.
36.

H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 25 (1971). Professor Krause

states:
Since the child's relationship to his mother is beyond doubt, statutes have long provided in nearly all states that, in matters of inheritance, the illegitimate occupies the
same position with respect to his mother as a legitimate child. Residual statutory
discrimination between legitimate and illegitimate offspring with respect to inheritance is very uncommon.
Id.
37. Brief, supra note 31, at 9. The brief, citing Krause, illustrates the factors which
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easily established; fatherhood has been more difficult to prove and
thus more easily feigned.
The trend followed by most American courts was to allow nonmarital children to inherit by allowing subsequent legitimation.3 8
This was done in most states by recognizing the inheritance rights
of illegitimate children whose parents married afterwards.3 9 Common law marriages also legitimated these children. 40 Some states
also allowed adoption or court adjudication of paternity to legitimate the child. Yet in virtually all jurisdictions, the key for the
child's inheritance hinged upon definitional legitimation of the parental relationship or some type of parental action. 41 As to the
child's legal relationship with his father, without redefining the parental acts as legitimate, the child was still-as in feudal common
law-being punished for the sins of his parents. The status of illegitimacy was not removed; the statutory revisions were merely
42
ameliorative.
Rooted in this philosophical context, the Texas probate statutes,
actually legitimated a non-marital child. By 1971, the following were factors which qualified
the child as legitimate: (1) invalid marriage, (2) subsequent parental marriage, (3) birth
within three hundred days after divorce, (4) legitimation pursuant to a paternity action, (5)
presumption of legitimacy from marriage, (6) common law marriage, (7) voluntary acceptance of paternal responsibility, (8) adoption, (9) admission into the father's family, and (10)
acknowledgment of the child in a specified form. Id. Interestingly each of these methods
centers around some type of paternal action or acknowledgement. In other words, without
some type of voluntary action on the father's part-either in acknowledgement of the child
or in marriage to the mother-the non-marital child's only recourse was through a paternity
suit. This obviously was to prevent spurious claims by the child.
38. KRAUSE, supra note 36, at 9. Krause states the following:
Legislative attack on the doctrine of filius nullius has taken several directions. All
states have legislation that reduces on a retail basis the instances in which a child is
born out of wedlock by the expedient of expanding the definition of "wedlock" or by
permitting legitimation after the child's birth.
Id.
39. Reed, 682 S.W.2d at 699. The Court of Appeals of Texas stated in pertinent part:
"An illegitimate child can now inherit from his father under three circumstances: (1) If he is
born or conceived before or during the marriage of his father and mother." Id.
40. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 111 (1981). Many states give legitimate
status to the child of nearly any relationship that resembles a formal marriage, e.g., ILL. REV.
STAT., ch. 40, 1351 (1979), despite the long-standing abolition of common-law marriage, ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 40, 212(c). See also MD. CODE ANN. art 16, 27 (1973). KRAUSE, supra, at 111
n.30.
41. Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 8-9. Methods of statutory legitimation in
Texas include valid marriage, common-law marriage, void marriage, informal adoption by
the father, and sworn and witnessed statement of paternity. Each of these factors corroborates the claim of paternity. Id.
42. Id. at 9. Ameliorative legislation has lessened the burden of illegitimacy without
removing the status itself. Such ameliorative statutes which allow inheritance without status
removal have required a showing of paternity coupled with an additional factor. Id.
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which caused the conflict in Reed, were drafted and approved by
the legislature. Section 42, which was enacted in 1956, exemplified
the attitudes stated above.'" While it allowed full inheritance from
the mother, paternal inheritance rights were allowed in only three
ways: (1) subsequent marriage by the parents, (2) common law
marriage of the parents, and (3) void marriages. 4" The thread of
continuity with the common law was drawn, for the child's relief
was definitional. Inheritance was allowed by redefining the parental acts as legitimate. 5 Still the interests and rights of the child
were not addressed.
Significantly, not only were societal mores changing but also the
posture of the Supreme Court. Beginning with the Court's
6
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education4
in 1954, the
idea of equal protection and the doctrine of individual rights
gained eminence. By 1957, the Court had struck down as impermissible a discriminatory Illinois statute dealing with economic issues.'7 The statute created one group which was subject to state
regulation while exempting another. This use of statutory definitions, which by their linguistic structure establish total closure for
an entire class while providing exemption for another, was reaffirmed as unconstitutional. Thus the framework was in place for
the Court to reexamine the legal rights of the non-marital child
through a new approach-the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The modern era which has advanced the rights of the non-marital child began with two cases in 1968.48 The key to the development was the notion that non-marital children were being denied
equal protection solely because of their classification as illegitimate
children. Levy v. Louisana 9 invalidated Louisiana's wrongful
death statute as unconstitutional because non-marital children
were summarily refused recovery for their mother's death, even
43. See supra text accompanying note 3.
44. Reed, 682 S.W.2d at 699.
45. Brief for Appellant, supra note 31, at 8. Definitional relief has made legitimate
some of the erstwhile "illegitimate" children by narrowing the definition of "illegitimate."
Ameliorative relief has been applied to persons retained within the status of illegitimacy to
make the deprivations attached to their status less harsh. Id.
46. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. Morey v Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Using the equal protection argument, the
Court invalidated the Illinois statute requiring licensing and state regulation for firms selling money because the American Express Company was exempted from the requirements.
This exemption, the Court felt, created a closed class which was impermissible. Id.
48. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 119 (1981).
49. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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though legitimate children were allowed recovery. Similarly, in
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co.," l a
mother was denied recovery for the wrongful death of her nonmarital child.52 In Levy, Justice Douglas concluded for the Court
that such discrimination was invidious because only the classification of the children as illegitimates and not any conduct or action
on their part was the cause of their inability to recover.5 3 Although
the response to these two decisions was not unanimous, many
courts construed these holdings as a signal to treat marital and
non-marital children equally. 4 Significantly, since proving the
mother/child relationship was not problematic, the first inroad,
utilizing the equal protection analysis for non-marital children, was
made through the child's legal relationship with his mother, not his
father. On the other hand, discriminatory statutes pertaining to
proof of paternity were usually upheld. 5
However three years later in Labine v. Vincent,5 the Court began examination of the child/father relationship. 7 Here the Court
refused to allow an illegitimate daughter of the deceased to inherit
from her intestate father.5 8 State expansion of the rights of nonmarital children which had begun with Levy and Glona was being
questioned. 9 Therefore, the trend did shift, and these two decisions were now narrowly construed; broadened constitutional protection for illegitimate children did not seem to apply in the area
of inheritance.6 In retrospect, Labine did not totally contradict
precedent, for it held that state probate statutes were constitu50. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). The Court stated: "It is invidious to discriminate against (the five illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of
theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother." Id. at 72.
51. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
52. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). This case
invalidated a Louisiana statute that denied a mother recovery for the wrongful death of her
non-marital child.
53. Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
54. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 122-23 (1981).
55. Id. at 121.
56. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
57. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Unlike Levy, the father in the Labine case
had acknowledged the child during his lifetime.
58. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 122 (1981).
59. Id. at 125.
60. Id. at 124-25. In re Estate of Hendrix, 68 Misc. 2d 439, 326 N.Y.S. 2d 646 (1971)
(statute conditioning illegitimate child's right to inherit from father on order of filiation
during father's lifetime upheld; Levy and Glona distinguished and Labine held controlling).
Similarly, In re Estate of Belton, 70 Misc. 2d 814, 335 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1972). H. KRAUSE,
CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 128 n.31 (1981).
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tional if the requirements did not present an insurmountable barrier to the child. The nature and the degree of allowable state intrusions were being examined.
By 1972, Justices Harlan and Black, who had strongly opposed
the new approach to illegitimacy, left the Court. This change in the
Court's composition probably accounts for the dramatic shift
which occurred one year later in Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. 6a Here the Court noted the hapless plight of the nonmarital child and utilized the equal protection argument to invalidate laws which discriminated against these children's birth status
62
without any legitimate countervailing state interest.
The trend of advancing the interests of the non-marital child
continued in 1973 with the decision in Gomez v. Perez." The
Court ruled that equal protection was violated by denying paternal
support to illegitimate children while granting it to their legitimate
counterparts. 64 The Gomez Court, citing Levy, concluded that once
a state bestowed a judicially enforceable right, the Constitution
forbid its non-applicability to an illegitimate child simply because
the parents had never married." Perhaps other state interests
would be sufficient to uphold a coterminous treatment of the nonmarital child; however, the marriage requirement had finally been
eclipsed. The Court did recognize the problem of spurious claims
of paternity; however, the Court stated that this problem could not
present an insurmountable barrier erected only as a smokescreen
to shield otherwise invidious discrimination. Since the Court had
signaled its position of acknowledging a heightened awareness of
the non-marital child's rights, the 1974 decision in Jiminez v.
. 61. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimate children
may not be excluded from sharing equally with other children in the recovery of workmen's
compensation benefits for the death of a parent).
62. Id. The Court stated: "Courts are powerless to prevent social opprobrium suffered
by these hapless children, but the equal protection clause does enable us to strike down
discriminatory laws to status of birth where as in this case the classification is justified by
no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise." Id. at 175-76.
63. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), rev'g 466 S.W.2d 41 (1971). Gomez stated
that insurmountable barriers would be found unconstitutional, and stressed that "any
problems of proof of paternity could not be made into an impenetrable barrier to shield
otherwise invidious discrimination. Gomez also noted that traditional equal protection scrutiny would be applied as well, and made it more explicit that the state could not deny
illegitimate children the benefits accorded children generally." Brief on the Merits, Reed,
No. 85-755, at 46-47.
64. 409 U.S. at 538.
65. Id. at 537-38.
66. Id. at 538.
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Weinberger 7 was predictable.6 8 Here the Court held unconstitutional a Social Security provision which denied disability benefits
to illegitimate children. 9 Clearly the Court was shifting focus and
was now addressing the rights of the non-marital child.
In 1976, Mathews v. Lucas70 created further confusion. 7 1 Courts
now focused upon which state-erected barriers were sufficient to
justify the additional requirements placed upon the non-marital
child.72 Mathews, which was decided against the interests of the
non-marital child, required illegitimate children-but not legitimate children-to prove dependency upon their fathers to receive
Social Security benefits. 7 3 Thus even though the decision was
against the non-marital child, the Court warned that without a
strong countervailing state interest, discriminatory state statutes
would be found unconstitutional,7 4 thereby foreshadowing the demise of the easily accommodated rational basis test. A high standard apparently would be utilized before an illegitimate child
could receive discriminatory treatment.
Finally, in Trimble v. Gordon the Court addressed the non-marital child's intestate rights. The case involved an Illinois probate
statute which denied intestate inheritance rights to non-marital
children. 75 In direct contradiction to Labine, Trimble held that the
67. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
68. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). The Social Security provision which
discriminated between two classes of non-marital children-(1) those who could inherit
from the parent under state law or those who were legitimated under state law or whose
illegitimacy resulted from a defect in the parent's ceremonial marriage and (2) those who
did not fall into either category-was declared unconstitutional. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT
IN AMERICA 128 (1981).
69. 417 U.S. at 628.
70. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
71. In Mathews, the Court sustained the Social Security Act since it allowed nonmarital children to receive benefits by proving actual dependency. Justice Blackmun cited
administrative convenience and allowed the Act to presume dependency with respect to
many categories of illegitimate children whose paternity was ascertained. However, those
non-marital children not falling within these categories were required to prove dependency.
Id. at 497-99.
72. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 129 (1981).
73. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 498.
74. Id. at 499.
75. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771. The Illinois statute stated in relevant part:
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any maternal ancestor, and of any
person from whom his mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of
an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by descent, any estate
which the parent would have taken, if living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents intermarry and who is acknowledged by the father as the father's child is
legitimate.
Id. at 764-65.
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difficulties of proving paternity were not sufficient justification for
total statutory disinheritance. 7 The facts of the case were quite
simple: the paternity of the illegitimate child was openly acknowledged by the father, he had been adjudicated the father in a paternity order requiring him to pay $15 per week support, and he had
lived with the child for the four years prior to his homicide.7 However, the Illinois statute-which is in all respects identical to those
in question in Reed-denied heirship rights solely due to the
child's birth status. 78 Thus for the first time, the Supreme Court,
using an equal protection argument, declared unequivocally the
position its previous cases had been developing: total statutory disinheritance was unconstitutional.7 e The Court did not establish
complete equality with the marital child, for in Lalli v. Lalli, 0 the
Court referred to the Trimble decision and distinguished it from
Mathews, noting that a non-marital child's requirement of proving
dependency upon his father served a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest. 8' Thus the statute in Mathews was not considered broadly discriminatory. On the other hand, since section 12 of
the Illinois statute disinherited a non-marital child who had been
adjudicated the illegitimate child of the deceased in a paternity
suit, the statute was broadly discriminatory and violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 2 Clearly a heightened level of scrutiny would be applied to these cases.
The Court retreated again in 1978 in Lalli, a upholding by a 5 to
4 margin a statute requiring paternity adjudication during a father's lifetime as a condition to intestate succession. 4 Even if the
non-marital child was publicly acknowledged, only formal adjudication allowed inheritance.8 5 The Court was struggling to reconcile
76. Id. at 772.
77. Id. at 764.
78. Id. at 765.
79. Id. at 772.
80. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
81. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). The Court stated in pertinent part:
The Illinois statute . . . was constitutionally flawed . . . We concluded that the
Equal Protection Clause required that a statute placing exceptional burdens on illegitimate children in the furtherance of proper state objectives must be more 'carefully
tuned to alternative considerations,' . . . quoting Mathews v. Lucas, . . . than was
true of the broad disqualification in the Illinois law.
Id. at 266-67.
82. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776.
83. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
84. Id. at 275.
85. Id. at 273.
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both the state's and the child's interests. Justice Powell acknowledged that the state had a legitimate concern for the orderly disposition of property at death.8 6 He reaffirmed the Court's position in
both Trimble and Mathews that classifications are permissible
only if there is a substantial relationship to a legitimate state interest.8 7 Justice Powell stated that Trimble simply made illegitimates
a closed class and was therefore unconstitutional.8 Yet he distinguished Mathews, for it allowed alternative considerations for the
non-marital child. 9 The flaw in this decision, according to Harry
Krause in his book Child Support in America, was that it provided
the states so much freedom that the range of acceptable proof of
paternity can be drawn too narrowly.9 0 In any case, the Court was
far from unanimous in its interpretation and reasoning. Justice
Blackmun, who concurred, quarrelled with the plurality in that it
did not entirely overrule Trimble."' Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens dissented since, although acknowledged and
supported, the illegitimate child was given no means to inherit
from his natural father.92 The disarray of the Court posed serious
problems for both lower and state courts.
With confusion reigning, the subsequent years enhanced rather
than diminished the turmoil. Naturally, state courts reached diverse holdings on similar issues. Uniformity was non-existent, and
Trimble was both construed and applied inconsistently. 3 Thus in
86. Id. at 271.
87. Id. at 273.
88. Id. at 266.
89. Id.
90. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 135 (1981). The author, quoting from the
Lalli decision, stated:
In affirming the judgment below, we do not, of course restrict a State's freedom to
require proof of paternity by means other than a judicial decree. Thus a state may
prescribe any formal method of proof, whether it be similar to that provided by 4-1.2
or some other regularized procedure that would assure the authenticity of the acknowledgment. As we noted in Trimble, such a procedure would be sufficient to satisfy the State's interests. LaWi, 439 U.S. at 272.
Krause, supra, at 135.
91. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 275.
92. Id. at 278-79. In his dissent, Justice Brennan states:
I see no reason to retreat from our decision in Trimble v. Gordon. The New York
statute on review here, like the Illinois statute in Trimble, excludes forms of proof
which do not compromise the State's interest. The statute thus discriminates against
illegitimates through means not substantially related to legitimate interests that the
statute purports to promote. I would invalidate the statute.
Id. (citation omitted).
93. KRAUSE, supra note 90, at 136. Krause cites as examples:
(1) Statutes requiring an acknowledgment of paternity by the putative father during his
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the twenty years since the United States Supreme Court had first
delved into the area of illegitimacy and equal protection, enormous
time and money had been spent litigating a relatively narrow topic.
With an admittedly heavy schedule, the Court had handed down
over twenty opinions, each trying to clarify the Court's position
upon the legal rights of the non-marital child. 9' Yet the chapter
remained cloudy, the water murky.
Obviously recognizing the need for restoring stability, the Court,
after years of tilting and veering, finally consolidated its views in
1982 in Mills v. Harbluetzel.25 The case held that for purposes of
child support, a one year statute of limitations violated equal protection for non-marital children.9' Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist,
who had authored the dissent in Trimble, was chosen by the Chief
Justice to write the opinion. The decision is significant because of
its display of the Court's accord in explicitly recognizing the rights
of the illegitimate child. Without hesitancy, the Court focused
upon the establishment of paternity, rather than the marriage of
the parents, as the nexus for the decision. 7 The focal point of the
opinion was the degree of state interest which would present an
lifetime before the illegitimate child may receive an intestate share of father's estate have
been upheld: Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E. 2d 762 (1979); Outlaw v. Planters
Nat. Bank & Trust, 41 N.C. App. 571, 255 S.E. 2d 189 (1979).
(2) Some states continue to require that a formal order of filiation have been made during
the father's life: Matter of Johnson's Estate, 560 P.2d 962 (Okla. 1977); Matter of Murray's
Estate, 90 Misc. 2d 852, 396 N.Y.S. 2d 149 (1977).
(3) Other statutes allow various methods of demonstrating paternity even after the putative father's death: C.L.W. v. M.J., 254 N.W. 2d 446 (1977); In re Estate of Blumreich, 84
Wis.2d 545, 267 N.W.2d 870 (1978).
(4) At least before Trimble some courts flatly held it constitutional for a state to exclude
illegitimates from inheriting property from their natural intestate fathers: Rias v. Henderson, 342 So. 2d 737 (Miss. 1977); Murray v. Murray, 549 S.W. 2d 839 (Ky. App. 1977); but
cf. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W. 2d 538 (Ky. 1977)(holding the same statute to be violative of the equal protection clause).
(5) Before and after Trimble, more courts, however, held such a blanket exclusion (of
illegitimate children from intestate succession, or a requirement that the child's parents had
married subsequent to its birth) a violation of equal protection guarantees: Allen v.
Califano, 456 F.Supp. 168 (D. Md. 1978); In re Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796
(1979); Rudolph v. Rudolph, 556 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. App. 1977); Matter of Sharp's Estate, 163
N.J. Super. 148, 394 A.2d 381 (1978); Matter of Sharp's Estate, 151 N.J. Super. 579, 377 A.
2d 730 (1977). KRAUSE, supra at 136-37 n.59.
94. Id. at 159.
95. Mills v. Harbluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). (a one year statute of limitations for establishing paternity denies illegitimate children the equal protection of the law).
96. Id. at 101.
97. Id. at 94. The Court states that "[tihe Code recognizes that establishment of paternity is the necessary first step in all suits by illegitimate children for support from their
natural fathers." Id.
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unjustifiable barrier violative of equal rights." In Mills, the Court
held that a state's restrictions must be substantially related to its
purpose to survive scrutiny. 9 This standard is significant because
of its recognition of a substantial-rather than rational-requirement for a statute to pass constitutional muster.
The second area of impact is provided by the concurrence. In
1981, Justice Stewart had left the Court and was replaced by Justice O'Connor. Since Stewart had usually held against the interest
of the non-marital child, O'Connor, who wrote a concurrence,
seems to have helped consolidate the Court's opinion. Her opinion
reasserts the notion that a state's interest must be sufficiently
weighty in order to justify a restriction. 100 Recognizing a strong
state interest in ensuring that genuine claims for child support not
be denied, Justice O'Connor continued by noting technological advancements in proving paternity and indicated that even longer
statutes of limitations might be unconstitutional. 10 1 Justice
O'Connor's opinion indicates her willingness to broaden the scope
of the non-marital child's interest through the utilization of a
higher standard than a mere rational basis test to justify a state's
interest.
The court's position was again reasserted in Pickett v. Brown in
1983. The Pickett Court unanimously stated that disparate treatment is permitted only if a substantial state interest is involved. 0 2
Equal protection demands invalidation of laws which create im98. Id. at 101. In pertinent part the Court stated:
In support suits by illegitimate children more than in support suits by legitimate
children, the State has an interest in preventing the prosecution of stale or fraudulent
claims, and may impose greater restrictions on the former than it imposes on the
latter. Such restrictions will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent they are
substantially related to a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 98-99.
99. Id. at 99. Since Mathews had first addressed the issue of whether this class should
utilize the strict scrutiny test, the question had been debated. In Levy, Blackman had answered negatively. Rehnquist had also addressed the issue in his Trimble dissent: "Illegitimacy . . . has never been held by the Court to be a 'suspect classification.'" Trimble, 430
U.S. at 781. Then in Boles, the dissenters, who did note that illegitimacy is invidious, added
that "classifications based on legitimacy violate the equal protection requirements of the
Fifth Amendment unless they bear a close and substantial reltionship to a permissible governmental interest." Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282, 303-04 (1977).
100. Mills, 456 U.S. at 103. Justice O'Connor went so far as to state that the state
interest is undercut by its own interest in "ensuring that genuine claims for child support
are satisfied." Id.
101. Id. at 104 n.2 (1982).
102. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983). The Pickett Court struck down a statute of
limitations which forced the non-marital child to bring suit to bring a legitimation action
within two years of his birth.
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penetrable barriers for the non-marital child.1 03 Through both
Mills and Pickett, the Court demonstrated that prevention of stale
and fraudulent claims is an insufficient interest to outweigh the
rights of the non-marital child.
Armed with this trend in reasoning, the Court unanimously held
in Reed that the equal protection analysis asserted in Trimble allows a non-marital child to inherit from her intestate father. 04 Initially, Reed centered upon which statutory enactments, amendments, or repeals applied to the issue present in this case. At
Prince Ricker's death on December 22, 1976, section 42 of the 1956
Texas Probate Code was controlling. 10 5 This section made subsequent marriage of the parents the exclusive condition for paternal
inheritance. 106 Thus Delynda was categorically denied any inheritance rights. Yet Trimble, which was decided in April, 1977-only
four months later-removed any doubt of the unconstitutionality
of section 42, for, as the statute in Trimble, the Texas statute
posed an insurmountable barrier for heirship of the non-marital
child.1 0 7 The probate code was amended later in 1977 and 1979, yet
even though these changes allowed inheritance by legitimate children, Delynda's case fell under the earlier statute which offered
her no opportunity to be legitimated.10 8
The significance of this decision began in 1968 with the requestioning of the rights of the non-marital child. Equal protection
supplied both the stimulus and the avenue. However, the focus was
slightly askew. The real thrust of change emerged in Trimble and
La li. The nexus for a decision involving legal rights of a non-marital child was no longer the validity of the marriage. Instead the
determinative factor became proof of paternity. If paternity can be
proved, the non-marital child does have a legal relationship with
his father-a relationship which includes inheritance. In a modern
society where many couples no longer feel that marriage is a necessary element for parenting, the ramifications for the non-marital
child are enormous. As such, this shift is reflective of sound policy.
Natural parenthood should serve as the nexus for deciding the
103.
104.
105.
11, 1986).
106.
107.
108.
1986).

Id. at 3.
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776.
Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Reed v. Campbell, No. 85-755, slip op. (U.S. June
Id. at 12.
Reed, 682 S.W.2d at 700.
Brief for Appellant at 13, Reed v. Campbell, No. 85-755, slip op. (U.S. June 11,
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child's rights.
In light of the Court's decisions following Trimble, the Reed
opinion was not surprising. More interesting was the Court's refusal to decide the case upon the issue of retroactivity. By utilizing
the reasoning of pre-Trimble precedents, the Court was able to
sidetrack the issue of retroactivity. This maneuver enabled the
Court's continuance of its established course concerning equal protection for non-marital childen unless a strong state interest countervailed. On the other hand, refusal to engage in any discussion of
retroactivity of statutory law establishes no additional precedential
law which might be used as ammunition in the Court's internal
struggle with retroactivity questions in criminal law, an issue still
unresolved by the Court.
Centuries of tradition intertwined with moral teachings have not
been easily eradicated. Exemplifying the pervasiveness of this attitude is a 1961 Ohio judicial opinion.10 9 The court, discussing the
Decalog which is the basis of our moral code, stated that the proposition of the passage of the father's sins upon three or four generations of children had solid, ethical foundations.1 10 Such reasoning personifies the problems which have faced the non-marital
child. Yet due to the social acceptance of parenting without marriage and the growing numbers of non-marital children within our
society, the importance of the Court's focusing upon the
child's-rather than the parent's-rights can not be understated.
The higher standard of a substantial countervailing state interest
seems both appropriate and necessary for this class's protection.
The unanimity of the Reed opinion seems to show the Court's empathetic posture as well as its solidarity in its desire to protect this
segment of modern society.
Sarah Jane Anderson

109.
110.

In re Dake, 87 Ohio Abs. 483, 486, 180 N.E.2d 646, 649 (1961).
Id. at 486.

